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Abstract:  
The relationship between political parties and voters is usually analysed in a national 
framework. However, the majority of states worldwide allow their emigrant citizens to 
vote from afar. This paper analyses how parties confront the challenge of mobilising voters 
across borders. We present an analytical framework for comparing the scope of party 
transnational mobilisation strategies across different electoral systems. Drawing on a 
contextualised qualitative analysis, the paper analyses transnational electoral mobilisation 
of the emigrant vote in recent elections in Spain, France, Italy and Romania. The analysis 
shows that a cost-benefit analysis of electoral incentives explains the scope of 
transnational campaign efforts of many of the political parties, Yet, we also suggest 
locating the analysis of party strategies in the particular context of the transnational 
electoral field, including the high dispersion, uncertainty and volatility of the emigrant 
vote and the overlap between the electoral arenas among emigrants and at home.  
Keywords: Parties, transnational, emigrants, elections, campaigns. 
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Introduction 
The linkages between parties and citizens are usually analysed in a framework which 
assumes that all voters reside within the national boundaries of the state. However, the 
majority of states worldwide, including 23 EU member-states, allow their citizens residing 
abroad to vote in the elections of their countries of origin.1 The implementation of external 
voting rights leads to the formation of new transnational political spaces of electoral and 
party competition. The analysis of campaign strategies, broadly understood as the actions 
undertaken by parties to influence voter decision, have been argued to constitute an 
important first step in understanding the structuring of electoral spaces (Karp et al. 2007; 
Lago and Martínez 2007). It is therefore timely to explore the role of parties in cross-
border democratic processes of mobilisation of the emigrant vote. How do parties confront 
the challenge of the transnationalisation of the electorate during electoral campaigns?  
This question addresses concerns across several fields of study. While marginal in 
the literature on parties and elections, the issue of how policies of emigrant voting rights 
decouple citizenship and territoriality stands increasingly central in studies of 
transnational migration and outreach policies of sending states. A growing number of 
scholars have unpacked the transnational outreach policies of emigrant countries and 
highlighted that political parties make their presence felt among enfranchised emigrant 
collectives (Burgess 2018; Meseguer and Burgess 2014; Paarlberg 2017; Tintori 2012; 
Østergaard-Nielsen 2003).   In these studies, it is also evident that not all parties reach out 
to emigrant voters in equal measure. In order to better understand what motivates or 
constrains parties, there is a need for more comparative analysis of variance across parties 
and countries. At the same time, this allows us to examine to what extent some of the 
concepts, measures, and hypotheses used to explain party behaviour on the national 
electoral scene may also explain parties’ engagement with transnational electorates.  
An important point of departure is the difference in motivation and limitations for 
party outreach to external/emigrant and domestic electorates. In terms of motivation we 
argue that the electoral impact of the emigrant vote depends on a range of factors such as 
the size and turnout of the emigrant electorate, the electoral system and the closeness of 
the election in the homeland. Although there is no systematic study of this effect, there are 
examples of the emigrant vote having a decisive impact on homeland elections such as the 
case of Italian legislative elections in 2006 or the Romanian presidential elections in 2007. 
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Limitations include that the political preferences of emigrant voters are un-polled in 
between elections, they are dispersed across often large numbers of countries of residence 
and therefore much more difficult to anticipate and mobilise compared to home 
constituencies (Caramani and Grotz 2015). Consequently, examining the motives, 
constraints and opportunities for why parties reach out to emigrant voters provides a 
welcome opportunity to strengthen the dialogue between studies of the politics of 
transnational migration, outreach policies of sending states, and the broader field of party 
and electoral studies.  
We compare the transnational campaigns for the emigrant vote across the main 
parties of Spain, France, Italy and Romania. These countries are similar in that they all 
have external voting rights and relatively large numbers of external voters residing abroad. 
However, they differ in terms of the particular emigrant electoral system, the past electoral 
impact of the emigrant vote as well as the trajectory of emigration (long-standing/recent). 
There are two overall types of electoral systems for emigrant voters. In most electoral 
systems, the emigrant vote is counted in the district in the homeland where the emigrant 
or her parents were last registered. A small albeit recently growing number of electoral 
systems allow emigrants to elect their own candidates and count the emigrant vote in a 
determined number of emigrant voter districts.  
In the following sections we present a framework for analysis of different degrees 
of transnational mobilisation of political parties. We then discuss how different 
configurations of macro and meso level factors may influence party strategies in the 
transnational electoral field across the four cases. The empirical analysis includes a 
mapping of the scope of transnational party strategies and a qualitative contextualised 
analysis of the main trends in and motivations for transnational campaigns among a 
selection of the parties. As detailed below, both sets of analysis draw on documentary 
material from the parties as well as interviews with campaign managers or other party 
representatives engaged in mobilising emigrant voters.  
 
Defining Transnational Electoral Outreach 
A wealth of studies have highlighted how the mobilisation and electioneering strategies 
of political parties adapt to the dynamics of changing and more volatile voter-party 
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alignments. Among the general trends is that parties have a more centralised and 
professionalised party organisation in constant campaign mode (Dalton et al. 2011; Mair 
et al. 2004). Parties have shifted towards more ‘Americanised’ campaigns relying on 
media impact, use of the internet of social media, opinion polls, and more personalised 
campaign messages (Dalton et al. 2011; Gibson and Rommele 2009; Norris 2005). The 
transnational mobilisation of the emigrant vote needs to be located in these changing 
contexts as well as the particular characteristics of the transnational electoral field.  
 In systems without special emigrant representation, the campaign strategies 
can be measured in terms of the amount of resources parties dedicate to be visible abroad 
among emigrant voters. In systems with special emigrant representation, the party decides 
whether to present candidates in the emigrant voter districts and how much support to 
offer them. In order to compare transnational campaign strategies across different electoral 
systems we suggest a framework which focuses on two dimensions: a) the formulation 
and communication of a particular set of policy proposals directed at emigrants, that is, 
the attempt to establish an ideological linkage (Dalton et al. 2011) with emigrant voters. 
b) The establishment of a transnational infrastructure of local branches of emigrant party 
members or supporters. These dimensions are not exhaustive. Other dimensions, notably 
the use of the internet and social media and alliances with parties, emigrant associations 
and other organisations in countries of residence would serve to complete the 
understanding of transnational electoral campaigning. Moreover, the intensity of local 
campaign activities, including visits of leaders of each party, or the particular effort of 
candidates for seats reserved for emigrants defines party outreach efforts. Even so, we opt 
for these broader indicators of party outreach in order to gather consistent information 
across both countries of origin and the many countries of residence as well as across 
systems where emigrants elect their own representatives and systems where the vote is 
part of the general pool at home.  
In terms of ideological linkage, we refer to the extent to which parties seek to 
engage with emigrants as an electoral group with a particular set of concerns. Strictly 
speaking the enfranchisement of the external electorate, in particular in a time of growing 
online access to homeland political affairs, could simply mean that emigrants would orient 
themselves in the general national campaign material and vote for the candidate or party 
that best correspond to their political preferences in the country of origin. However, 
emigrants may also have a particular set of problems and needs in relation to their 
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homeland. Indeed, the growing literature on outreach policies by sending states has 
highlighted how countries of origin seek to support the socio/economic, political and 
religious situation and rights of their citizens abroad and institutionalise their continued 
political and economic relations with their country of origin (Østergaard-Nielsen 2016; 
Gamlen 2008; Collyer 2013; Ragazzi 2014). Across the countries we have studied, the list 
of issues of concern to emigrants largely reflects these dimensions. Campaign material 
address the rights and obligations of non-resident citizens and include extension or 
restriction of their political rights (emigrant voting arrangements), social rights (access to 
social security and other welfare provisions in the homeland; homeland support of 
language and schooling of emigrant children), consular services, return policies, and tax 
arrangement for non-resident citizens abroad. Also, the party may include broader 
messages of concern and recognition of emigrants in their main electoral programmes. 
The salience of these issues in party programmes is an indicator of party interest in 
emigrants as a voter group.  
In terms of transnational infrastructure we focus on the network of external local 
party branches which represent the political party among the emigrant collectives in their 
respective countries of residence. One could suppose that transnational campaigning 
should be easier in the age of digital communication. It is no more difficult to log on to 
the French Socialist Party (PS) Facebook page from New York than from Paris. Similarly, 
national mass media is often globally available for anyone with an Internet connection and 
the right language skills. However, evidence from broader studies of party linkages 
suggests that local campaign events are a priority and direct contact with a candidate or 
party worker has been identified as the potentially most influential campaign activity 
(Dalton et al. 2011; Karp et al. 2007). It is therefore interesting to scrutinise to what extent 
political parties extend this logic to the external electorate in terms of committing 
resources to on-the-ground campaigning abroad.  
Together these two dimensions combine to the following categories of degrees of 
transnational party strategies:  
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Table 1: Four categories of transnational party strategies. 
 Degree of ideological linkage 
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 Low High 
High Parties with few policy proposals 
related to emigrants but an extensive 
transnational infrastructure 
Parties with many policy proposals related 
to emigrants and an extensive transnational 
infrastructure 
Low Parties with few policy proposals 
related to emigrants and a limited 
transnational infrastructure 
Parties with many policy proposals related 
to emigrants but a limited transnational 
infrastructure 
 
 
Motives and Constraints for Transnational Outreach to Emigrant Voters  
Costs, Benefits and Electoral Institutions 
Theories of party competition argue that parties contest elections and strengthen their 
campaign efforts when the benefits outweigh the cost. This type of analysis centres on the 
extent to which party resources interact with electoral institutions, political competition 
and party expectations regarding electoral behaviour. In terms of the relationship between 
electoral systems and the entry decisions of party elites, the traditional understanding is 
that majoritarian SMD systems tend to favour two-party systems and proportional systems 
tend to favour multi-party systems through both a mechanical and a psychological logic 
(Duverger 1954; Cox 1997). Moreover, parties are more likely to strengthen their 
campaigns in candidate-based and single-member districts where they expect the votes to 
turn into seats (Cox 1999; Karp et al. 2007).  
In the majority of electoral systems, the emigrant votes join the general pool of 
votes in the last district of residence. Hence, winning the emigrant vote does not 
necessarily guarantee any seats and the impact of emigrant voters depends on the general 
electoral rules in place. In that sense the number of parties campaigning abroad could be 
more or less an extension of the situation on the national electoral scene. In more 
proportional systems, such as Spain, the emigrant vote can boost the overall national vote 
share of any competing party, in more majoritarian systems, such as the UK, only the votes 
for the winning party in that particular district count. To some extent the system of special 
emigrant representatives is akin to a candidate based single majority pluralist system 
where the winner takes all in each district. This would favour a two party system in the 
emigrant districts regardless of the party system prevailing in the country of origin.  
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Political competition includes another set of factors explaining the intensity of 
electoral campaigns. Across electoral systems, parties have an incentive to strengthen their 
campaign activities if the electoral result is expected to be close (Karp et al. 2007; Kriesi 
et al. 2005; Matsusaka 1993). Similarly, parties could be expected to intensify their chase 
for the emigrant vote if the electoral result among emigrants is expected to be close (in 
cases of special emigrant representatives) or in their homeland district (in cases of 
emigrant votes being part of the pool in the homeland). In either case these incentives are 
further reinforced in cases where the overall national result is close and a few seats can tip 
the balance between the main parties or coalitions. A recent study shows that MPs pay 
more attention to emigration issues in their legislative and non-legislative activities the 
more their party receives the emigrant vote and when previous electoral result among 
emigrants was close (Østergaard-Nielsen and Ciornei 2017). 
The electoral incentives and patterns of representation deriving from the different 
configurations of electoral systems and competition have been found to be moderated by 
different level of resources among political parties (Karp et al. 2007). Larger parties with 
more resources and expertise tend to have a wider appeal related to their more 
comprehensive policy platform and the fact that they are serious contenders for political 
office than do single issue parties at the extremes of the electoral spectrum (Dalton et al, 
2011). Notably, parties with mass organisations, which are usually a feature of mainstream 
centre-left and centre-right parties, have been found to be more capable of bridging the 
distance to not just partisan but also independent voters (Rohrschneider and Whitefield 
2012). Larger party organisations include developed party structures which enable the 
party leadership to communicate with local chapters, linkages with interest groups and 
strong membership figures (Ibid). It is likely that parties with such broader appeal and 
more resourceful and well connected organisations and campaign machinery are also 
better equipped to take on electoral mobilisation abroad. Established parties which have a 
longer trajectory of mobilising emigrant voters, are also more likely to continue to do so 
since they already have the relevant infra-structure and connections in place. In contrast, 
new parties, especially those running for the first time, have less knowledge of their 
potential voter support abroad and could be expected to mainly prioritise the domestic 
electoral campaign over the extension of a transnational infra-structure to reach out to 
emigrants. However, a dimension particularly relevant to the transnational electoral setting 
is also the extent to which parties grow out of or are linked up with transnational social 
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movements or interest groups facilitating a stronger international grassroots-based 
network of contacts. A point in case are the grassroots links of green parties (Dietz 2000) 
or protest parties which have a stronger transnational network of contacts even if they are 
newcomers on the electoral scene. 
According to this type of cost-benefit analysis we would therefore expect that the 
category of the parties with an extensive transnational infrastructure and many emigrant 
related policies include mainly the larger more established parties with a record of 
substantial emigrant voter support as well as parties who grow out of social movements 
or maintain a strong affiliation with transnational networks of activists. There should be 
more incentive for transnational party campaigns in systems with special emigrant 
candidates and districts. Meanwhile the category of the parties with a limited transnational 
infrastructure and few proposals related to emigrants in their electoral programmes would 
include small and/or new parties with negligent prior emigrant electoral support. Elections 
where the emigrant support is expected to be close and make a difference in the overall 
results would reinforce the incentive to go transnational among parties in either category. 
 
Lack of Information and Overlapping Electoral Arenas 
Several main characteristics of external voting rights and transnational electoral fields may 
temper the straightforward application of a cost-benefit analysis to the transnational 
outreach of parties. First, information on emigrant electoral behaviour is relatively 
imperfect compared to the national scene. Parties face an external electorate dispersed in 
many different countries of residence, often relatively low turnout rates, and uncertainty 
regarding emigrant voter preferences, which, importantly, are un-polled in between 
elections. The emigrant vote does not necessarily follow the domestic vote as has been 
illustrated by the fact that Spanish emigrant voters have always supported the incumbent 
government since the granting of voting rights in 1978. Consequently, it is more difficult 
for parties to target those emigrant votes that could prove crucial to winning a seat in an 
external or national district. Instead, parties may seek to catch up with their main 
competitors in order to increase their visibility in terms of both their policy message and 
presence on the ground in order not to be relatively absent in the eye of the emigrant voter.  
This dimension of uncertainty can moreover be further reinforced if the trajectory 
of emigration and/or the implementation of external voting rights are more recent. Parties 
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in a country which implements external voting rights many decades after major waves of 
outmigration may have a somewhat clearer idea of the political profile of the emigrants. 
In contrast, those countries which implement external voting rights after only recent flows 
of outmigration may have less knowledge of the political preferences and organisation of 
their citizens abroad. We could therefore expect parties in these countries to be wearier of 
investing in a transnational campaign.  
Second, studies of party behaviour in the domestic setting have highlighted that 
parties campaign in districts where they are unlikely to win because of the interdependence 
between different electoral settings (Best 2010; Guinjoan 2014; Raymond 2016). An 
interesting concept in that respect is that of overlapping electoral arenas, with electoral 
arena referring to any constituency or group of constituencies where elections are being 
held (Guinjoan 2014). The decision to enter into competition in one electoral arena can be 
‘contaminated’ by the chances of achieving representation in another overlapping electoral 
arena. For instance, in Spain regional parties with little electoral support outside their own 
region, may still run nation-wide campaigns in national elections because such larger 
campaign boosts their image as a party with a national reach in the eye of the regional 
electorate (Lago and Montero 2009).  
The concept of overlapping electoral arenas can also apply to party transnational 
outreach. First, campaigning abroad in national legislative elections may be closely related 
to domestic overlapping electoral arenas such as an upcoming presidential or regional 
election where the emigrant vote may be more influential for the outcome. Parties may 
seek to mobilise the emigrant vote in elections with no prior or expected record of 
closeness or particular impact of the emigrant vote because the vote has been or is expected 
to be important in other upcoming elections. Second, this concept can apply to the 
interdependence, which may exist between the emigrant and homeland electoral arenas. 
The transnational character of most contemporary migration blurs the distinction between 
domestic and external electorates and districts. Recent studies, in particular based on cases 
from central and Latin America, have argued that migrants can be part of political 
processes in their countries of origin through their transfer of remittances, values and 
political opinions (Boccagni et al. 2015; Mahmoud et al. 2013; Pfutze 2014). In 
continuation it could be expected that parties may be motivated to reach out to emigrant 
voters because they believe that their linkage with the emigrant electorate may indirectly 
spill over into support from the local electorate. In this scenario, overlapping electoral 
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arenas between abroad and at home could explain why emigrants are of interest to smaller 
parties whose main national constituencies include high rates of voters abroad.  
 
Emigration, Voting Rights and Electoral Dynamics across the Cases 
The countries analysed here have large numbers of emigrants residing abroad, but they 
differ in terms of the history of emigration, geographical dispersion and overall profile of 
emigrants (see table 2). Spain and Italy have longstanding labour emigration, yet the 
current profile of citizens abroad is mixed as it includes several generations and recent 
outflows of highly educated migrants ( Lugilde 2007; Tintori 2012). The French expat 
community has a large proportion of highly skilled that even bypasses the rate in the 
country of origin. 2 Romanian emigration intensified post 1989 with intense flows of 
labour emigration to other EU member-states and their profile was, at the time of the 
research, less known to the political parties.  
 
Table 2. Main characteristics of the emigrant electorate in Spain, Italy, Romania and France.  
Country Number of citizens 
abroad 
Number of voters 
abroad/% over total 
electorate 
Main regions and countries of 
destination 
Spain 
 
1702778 1482786/ 
4,1% 
 
South America (Argentina), Europe 
(France, Germany) 
Italy 4341156 3494687/ 
7,5 % 
Europe (Germany, Switzerland), South 
America (Argentina), North America, 
Australia 
Romania 3007350* n.a.* Europe (Italy, Spain) North America 
France 1611054 1006700/ 
2,3 % 
Europe (Switzerland, UK), North 
America, Middle East (Israel), North 
Africa (Morocco) 
Own elaboration from: Ellis et al (2007); http://www.idea.int/vt/; France: Rapport du Gouvernement sur la 
situation des Français établis hors de France 2014; http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr;  
http://www.interieur.gouv.fr/Elections/Les-resultats Italy: http://elezionistorico.interno.it/; AIRE, 
http://servizidemografici.interno.it; Romania: http://www.becparlamentare2012.ro/: 
http://www.bec2009p.ro; United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2013). Trends in 
International Migrant Stock: Migrants by Destination and Origin, Spain: Pere, 
http://www.ciudadaniaexterior.empleo.gob.es; http://www.infoelectoral.interior.es/min/. *Due to the lack of 
registration of Romanian voters abroad we only have the number first generation Romanians abroad. 
Numbers of emigrants, registered voters and turnout  are from the last election before 2013. 
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In terms of type and recent changes in voting rights, Spain has allowed emigrants to vote 
since the constitutional changes related to the transition to democracy in 1978. However, 
in the year before the elections in 2011 these voting rights were restricted through a change 
of registration procedure (el voto rogado) and a disenfranchisement at the local level. 
Although Italy has an emigration trajectory comparable to Spain, emigrants were not 
granted the right to vote until the electoral reform in 2001 on the initiative of the right 
wing National Alliance. This reform allowed Italians abroad to elect 12 deputies and six 
senators across four electoral districts abroad. Romania allowed for the external vote in 
2001 with a stronger reference to the enfranchisement of the Romanian minority in 
 Hungary than the emigrant workers, the majority of whom had left over the 
past decade. An electoral reform in 2008 also gave the emigrants the right to elect four 
deputies and two senators across two electoral districts. French emigrants have been able 
to vote in presidential elections since 1981 and have an even more longstanding trajectory 
of indirectly elected special emigrant representatives in the Senate (currently 12 senators). 
An electoral reform led by the Union for a Popular Movement (UMP) in 2008 allowed the 
French expats to vote and elect 11 deputies in legislative elections for the National 
Assembly in 2012.  
Consequently, Italy and Spain have largely similar histories and volumes of 
emigration but have different emigrant electoral systems. The inclusion of France allows 
us to compare party transnational outreach during the first legislative election with 
emigrant voting rights. Meanwhile, Romania is a case of more recent outmigration and 
relatively less information on the size, profile and preferences of the emigrant voters. 
Because of the recent electoral reforms in the cases of Romania and France, three of the 
four cases analysed in this paper allow emigrants to elect their own legislative 
representatives while one case, Spain, does not. Although such systems are a minority 
worldwide, several EU member-states (France, Romania, Italy, Portugal and Croatia) have 
opted for them during recent electoral reforms. 
Moreover, the electoral dynamics of the external vote vary across the cases studied. 
Turnout is usually low among emigrant votes as the cost of voting (e.g. logistics, access 
to information) is much higher than for voters at home (Lafleur 2013). Across the cases, 
Spain, Italy and France have experienced fairly stable turnouts between 30 and 40 per cent 
(calculated as number of voters over number of registered voters), although the turnout for 
Spain dropped all the way to five per cent in 2011 after the registration restrictions. 
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Turnout for Romania is difficult to assess as there are no official statistics for the number 
of voters abroad and no system of voter registration. Romanian emigrants vote by simply 
showing their passport at the polling station. An estimate based on UN foreign born 
Romanian residents abroad indicate a very low turnout of around 2 per cent in legislative 
elections and 4 per cent in presidential elections. 
The electoral preferences among emigrant voters are not always aligned with the 
voting patterns in the domestic constituencies, nor are they consistent over time. For 
instance, Spanish external voters tend to vote for the incumbent party (Lugilde 2007) 
although the electoral support for the two main parties of the Popular Party (PP) and the 
Spanish Socialist and Workers Party (PSOE) was very close in the 2011 election. In the 
case of France, the presidential candidate for the UMP (and its predecessors) has always 
won the emigrant vote (Collard 2013). In Italy, the introduction of the right for emigrants 
to vote and elect their own representatives was originally supported by the right wing 
National Alliance, yet it is the centre-left which has taken more support among overseas 
voters since 2006 (Tintori 2012).  
Also, the impact of the vote differs across the cases. In Italy and Romania there 
are examples of the emigrant vote changing the overall outcome of the election. The close 
call of the Italian 2006 election heightened the role of the overseas vote when the emigrant 
candidates for the Senate secured the majority for the Prodi led coalition, despite the centre 
right gaining more votes. In both 2006 and 2008 competition in some of the districts was 
very close with less than one per cent difference between the main parties. Moreover, the 
competition in the emigrant districts was close not only between the two main parties of 
the Democratic Party (PD) and the People of Freedom (PdL), but also between smaller 
parties such as the centrist Union of the Centre (UDC) the Italy of Values party and 
emigrant led parties such as the Associative Movement of Italians Abroad (Maie). In 
particular in the case of the Senate elections, the results changed markedly across the 
districts between 2006 and 2008 showing the parties that these are not safe seats. In the 
case of Romania, the emigrant vote gained importance in the presidential elections during 
the 2000s. Most notably the Democratic Liberal Party (PDL), led by Basescu, won the 
presidential election in 2009 thanks to the emigrant vote. The emigrant vote was not 
decisive in the 2008 legislative election, but the PDL won the seats in all districts for both 
the National Assembly and the senate except for the 4th world district.3  
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In the case of Spain and France the vote has never made a difference to the overall 
outcome of national legislative (Spain) or presidential (France) elections. However, the 
debates of the UMP proposal for special emigrant representatives in the National 
Assembly indicate that parties do care about the emigrant vote. These debates included 
accusations of gerrymandering favouring the UMP from the Socialist Party (Østergaard-
Nielsen et al. 2015). In the case of Spain where the vote is counted as part of the pool of 
votes in districts in Spain, the emigrant vote has been decisive for the electoral outcome 
in close races at the district level. In 2008, the emigrant vote guaranteed a seat for the 
Popular Party over the Convergence and Union (CiU) in Catalunya and in the Canary 
Islands it secured a seat for the Canarian Coalition (CC) in the Senate.4 Moreover, the 
impact of the emigrant vote has proven to be decisive for the overall allocation of seats in 
close races between parties in elections in the autonomous communities with a high 
percentage of emigrant voters such as Galicia, Asturias, the Basque Country or the Canary 
Islands. 5  In a few cases the emigrant vote decided the composition of the regional 
government such as in Galicia 2005 and Asturias 2012.6  
 
Methodology 
In the following analysis we centre on a broad selection of parties with parliamentary 
representation across the largely moderate and bipolarised party systems in all four cases 
(See Appendix 1). The research focuses on the most recent election in each country during 
the period of research from 2011-2013. The data is collected through 51 interviews with 
representatives from central or local offices and emigrant representatives from 25 political 
parties, online documentary research on national press, party websites, bulletins and party 
Facebook pages for citizens abroad, analysis of main emigrant online news forums and 
official statistical information on external voters and voting. The interviewees have been 
chosen through general contact with the party. Some parties, like the Italian Democratic 
Party or the main centre-right and left parties in Spain, have a coordinator of the 
transnational infrastructure and electoral outreach to emigrants. In most cases the parties 
have referred us to the general campaign coordinator or one of the special emigrant 
representatives with a coordinating role in transnational campaigns. We have triangulated 
information from research on party documents with the information and interpretation 
from interviews. 
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We first present an overview of the distribution of the parties across the four 
categories of transnational party strategies combining ideological linkage and 
transnational infrastructure. Here the ideological linkage is counted as the word-ratio 
related to emigrants in the electoral programme, of each party akin to the identification of 
section length as a measure of salience of a particular policy domain (Pappi and Seher 
2009). The relevant sections, identified through the search for a pre-established list of 
keywords, are in some cases titled sections or phrases within the general programme and 
in a few cases specific emigrant programmes posted on the website of the party. The choice 
of identifying a word-ratio instead of a ratio of quasi-sentences is related to our interest in 
identifying not just the number of statements or policy proposals (see Appendix 1), but 
also the broader formulations regarding the role and importance of emigrants.  
The numbers of local branches in countries of emigrant residence are based on the 
self-reported numbers of the political parties through their own documentary sources 
(websites) and/or through interviews. We have tended to prioritise the information 
collected through the websites when establishing the number of branches, while the 
interviews served to deepen our understanding of the development of branches abroad. In 
a few cases (four) we only have the estimate by the party representative obtained through 
the interview (see furthers details in Appendix 1). The interviews have clarified that across 
the cases, the actual nature of these local branches range from staffed offices to a list of 
contact persons per country of residence of the website of the party. Given the high 
dispersion of values of policy proposals and transnational infrastructure, the placement of 
parties according to the categories mentioned in Table 1 is based on the log value of 
ideological linkage and branches (see Figure 1).  
 
Going after the Emigrant Vote 
The initial mapping of the degree to which parties go after the emigrant vote shows both 
differences and similarities among parties across the cases. In the category of parties with 
an extensive transnational infrastructure and many policy proposals related to emigrants, 
we find all the major and established centre-right and centre-left parties in the four cases. 
In line with the Duvergerian scenario, these parties have a history of taking the lion’s share 
of the emigrant electoral support and have, given their trajectory and size, more resources 
to meet the cost of transnational campaigning (see Appendix 1).  
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Figure 1: Transnationalisation of electoral campaigns among parties in Spain, Italy, France and Romania 
 
 
Notes: Logarithmic scale. Axes cross at the median values of the variables ideological linkage (0.67) and 
transnational infrastructure (10.01)  
Sources: For sources and abbreviations, see Table 2 and Appendix 1. 
 
Across the cases these parties also have a set of more context specific electoral 
incentives to care about the emigrants and the emigrant vote. In the case of Spain, both 
major parties make reference to the regional electoral dynamics as an incentive to reinforce 
their external campaign structure and message in national elections. First, the PSOE 
expanded its transnational network and policy message towards emigrants during 1996-
2003 under the leadership a leading PSOE figure of Galician descent (Interview PSOE, 
January 2012). Later the PP intensified its transnational network from a presence in only 
six countries to 44 offices in 27 countries between 2008 and 2011 (Interview PP, 
December 2011) following the PPs loss of its long-standing government of Galicia to a 
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coalition between PSOE and the Galician Nationalist Bloc (BNG) in 2005. During this 
period the electoral programmes of both parties aimed at emigrants also tended to catch 
up with each other as the parties addressed more recent emigration and a more complex 
profile of the emigrant voter to encompass a broader range of interests. The restriction of 
voter registration in 2010 did not lead the PSOE or PP to diminish the scope of their 
campaign messages to emigrants or their numbers of local branches abroad, despite 
expectations of a lower turnout.  
Italy has a shorter trajectory of emigrant voting than Spain, but the decisive role of 
the emigrant vote in the 2006 elections has been an incentive to pursue the emigrant vote. 
Moreover, there have been close runs in several emigrant districts and in particular in the 
two American districts where Italian parties compete with emigrant led parties such as the 
Maie. Although the enfranchisement of emigrants was largely driven by the right, the 
centre-left PD has set up a very comprehensive network of local branches (circuli). These 
branches are embedded in a multi-level structure of regional and national coordinators 
similar to the organisation of the PD within Italy (interview with PD, June 2013). In 
contrast the transnational network of the centre-right PdL is not just more limited in terms 
of numbers but also appears less institutionalised. The PdL itself links this to the fluid 
person-based management of the PdL (Interview PdL, June 2013).  
In France, parties cite the introduction of special emigrant representatives in the 
National Assembly after 2008 as an important incentive to intensify their campaign for 
the emigrant vote in the 2012 legislative election. Both of the main parties have a long-
standing connection with emigrant voters due to their indirectly elected special 
representatives in the Senate and their voting rights in presidential elections from 1981.  
In 1980 sympathizers of the PS set up the Democratic Association for the French Abroad 
(ADFE) as a balance to the right-wing dominated Union for the French abroad (UFE) 
created already in 1927 (Collard, 2013). In terms of party organization abroad, the Rally 
for the Republic (RPR), precursor to the UMP, set up their own federation for the French 
abroad in the late 1970s, followed by the PS (1983) and the Union for French Democracy 
(UDF) (1984) (Interviews with PS and UMP, November 2012). With the UMP–led 
electoral reform in 2008 both major parties have intensified their transnational campaigns. 
Both parties launched comprehensive electoral programmes only for emigrants, with the 
PS programme in particular including 28 detailed sections. 
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In the case of Romania, the decisive role of the emigrant vote in the 2009 
presidential elections combined with the introduction of special emigrant representatives 
encouraged all major Romanian parties to establish networks of local branches and contact 
points in especially Europe and the USA. Similar to the ‘catch up’ logic in the other cases, 
one of the major parties went transnational before the others. While the other main parties 
had mainly ignored the emigrant vote, the PDL had since 2006 established a wide network 
of branches in especially Spain and Italy from 2006. In the run up to the 2008 legislative 
elections, both the centre-right PDL and the Social Democrat Party (PSD)7 sought to 
strengthen their territorial presence in Europe and North America by actively identifying 
local party members and sympathisers. As commented by the representative of the Social 
Democrat and Liberal Union (USL), the success of the PDL in capturing the emigrant vote 
in the presidential referendum from 2007, made the social democrats and liberals realise 
the importance of this electoral group (interview, USL, December 2012). Illustratively, in 
the run-up to the 2012 elections, the People Party (PPDD), founded only in 2011, 
immediately launched what they refer to as a more “focused” transnational strategy citing 
more than 53 local branches in Spain and Italy where there is a high concentration of 
Romanian emigrant voters (interview PPDD, December 2012).  
However, the Romanian parties have established a rather weak ideological linkage 
compared to the other parties in this category. The ratio of the emigrant related proposals 
is influenced by the fact that the Romanian electoral programmes are significantly shorter 
than their Spanish, French and Italian counterparts. Whereas the Alliance Just Romania 
(ARD) and PPDD do have a special section in their program dedicated to the emigrants, 
their policy proposals are few and relatively unspecified. The parties cite the recent history 
of Romanian migration and the necessity to better understand what claims and needs 
emigrants may have, before formulating more specific emigrant policies (interviews with 
ARD, February 2013 and USL, December 2012).  
As these examples illustrate, the dynamic in Spain, France and Romania is for 
major parties to ‘catch up’ with each other in terms of both their number of branches 
abroad and the particular policy proposals directed at emigrant voters. The case of Italy 
differs as the PdL was relatively ‘unpresent’ abroad in terms of both local branches and a 
party level emigrant policy compared to the PD during the time period included in this 
research.  
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 Besides these major parties, only the Europe Ecology – The Greens (EELV) from 
France displayed a relatively strong transnational outreach. The Greens have had a relative 
lack of emigrant electoral support in past elections, but the party cites the possibility of 
winning seats in the National Assembly in the 2012 elections as an important incentive to 
include an independent section on emigrants in their main programme, create a party 
federation for emigrant voters and field candidates in nine of the 11 districts. Moreover, 
the party increased its transnational organisational resources through the merger with 
Europe Ecology whose extensive network of transnational contacts facilitated the 
mobilisation for the emigrant vote (interview, EELV, November 2012). This experience 
shows that a stronger transnational network related to social movements constitute a 
highly relevant resource for outreach to emigrant voters.  
In the category of parties with an extensive transnational infrastructure but few 
policy proposals related to emigrants, we find parties which can spend resources on a 
transnational presence among emigrant voters but choose to campaign mainly on their 
national programme. In the case of the Five Star Movement (M5S) the motive appears to 
be a combination of the type of party with a stronger grass-root based organisation and the 
fact that this was the party’s first national electoral campaign. In order to capture the 
emigrant vote, the party mobilised 21 local branches abroad (called ‘meet ups’) led by 
sympathisers among emigrants and presented 19 candidates for the Chamber of deputies 
and 12 for the Senate. To that end they used a growing network of M5S supporters residing 
abroad (interview with M5S, July 2013). In contrast to the M5S, the Front National (FN) 
has a longstanding trajectory in terms of the emigrant vote in presidential elections 
although its support has never come close to that of the two main parties of the UMP and 
PS or its success among the national electorate. The Front National claimed 23 branches 
abroad during its 2012 campaign and presented candidates in all districts. The M5S relates 
its lack of specific emigrant policy proposals to the fact that this was their first national 
election and the strong priority of the party to reform of Italian politics. The FN linked 
their candidates to the main programme of Marie le Pen, which made no reference to 
emigrant voters.  
The category of parties with a limited transnational infrastructure but with many 
policy proposals for emigrants includes two smaller Spanish parties who have not invested 
in a transnational local network because of a lack of resources or a strong geographical 
concentration of their main group of emigrant supporters. Both the United Left (IU) and 
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the Canarian Coalition (CC) have been reaching out to emigrants for decades and motivate 
their transnational campaign with a sense of affinity and responsibility towards the 
emigrant voters. Despite a decline in electoral support from emigrants, the IU continues 
to emphasise its commitment to represent the concerns of Spanish workers abroad. Yet, 
their resources only allow for maintaining their six branches abroad within the EU 
(Interview, IU, June 2012). The CC also motivates reaching out to emigrants with its 
historical and strong connections to emigrants originating from the Canary Islands. There 
is, moreover, an important electoral incentive as the CC have won more than 50 per cent 
of the emigrant vote in the 2003 and 2007 regional elections. Indeed, in the 2008 national 
elections the CC won a senator based on the marginal difference made up by the emigrant 
vote (Lugilde 2007). The CC electoral programme makes references to the Canarians 
abroad as an important part of the Canarian polity and argues that this sends an important 
message both abroad and at home. However, most of these emigrants live in Venezuela, 
which is why the CC has concentrated its local presence there. The CC exemplifies how 
electoral incentives in overlapping arenas between regional and national politics in the 
homeland shape party transnational strategies.  
In the case of Italy, the Civic Choice, which ran for the first time in 2013 under the 
leadership of outgoing prime minister Mario Monti, motivates its transnational campaign 
with a perception that especially voters based in other EU countries would support this 
party. Their candidate for the European district had already served as a special emigrant 
representative for the PdL in 2008-2013 and had experience and local contacts facilitating 
the campaign. Moreover, the party reduced the cost of campaigning by going into coalition 
with the main emigrant led party, Maie, in the American districts. Finally, in the case of 
Romania, the Democratic Hungarian Party (UDMR) has a set of policies addressing ethnic 
Hungarians born in Romania who emigrated to Hungary, mostly related to party’s 
mediating role in improving their status in the host country. However, the party does not 
report any infrastructure beyond the Romanian borders.  
In the last category of the parties with a limited transnational infrastructure and 
few policy proposals for emigrants we find a range of parties from all four countries which 
have in common that they are small, have little prior support among emigrant voters in 
previous elections or do not support emigrant enfranchisement in the first place. For 
instance, at the time of this research, the Republican Left of Catalunya (ERC) 
representative explained that the high dispersion of Catalan origin emigrant voters 
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combined with low rates of participation rendered them uninteresting for both them and 
the other main Catalan party, the Covergence and Union (Interview, ERC July 2012). 
Moreover, three of the parties in this category refer to a lack of enthusiasm for the emigrant 
enfranchisement combined with scarce resources as part of their decision to not campaign 
abroad. In the case of Spain, the regional party of the Galician Nationalist Bloc (BNG) is 
based in a context with high numbers of emigrant voters (>14 per cent of the Galician 
electorate) which mainly support the PP and PSOE in regional and national elections. The 
BNG has repeatedly supported legislative proposals abolishing or reducing emigrant 
voting rights (Lugilde 2007). That said, the BNG mainly cites lack of resources as the 
main reason for not keeping up any official network of party branches abroad (Interview 
BNG, June 2012). The Left Front from France (FdG) and the Italian Left Ecology Freedom 
(SEL) are both coalitions of left-wing parties running under a new joint label for the 
elections in 2012 and 2013 respectively. The FdG fielded candidates in all 11 districts but 
offered limited resources in terms of joint emigrant related campaign programme and 
travel expenses. They made use of some of the infrastructure and networks of the French 
Communist Party but had no transnational infra-structure of their own yet (Interview FdG, 
February 2013). The SEL decided to field candidates under their own party label in the 
European district only and endorse the PD candidates in the rest of the world. Besides 
references to a lack of resources, SEL also emphasised that it sees the (lack of) immigrant 
voting rights as a more important issue than the vote and situation of non-resident Italians 
(Interview SEL, June 2013).  
 
Conclusions 
The enfranchisement of emigrants creates a transnational electoral field between 
homelands and citizens abroad. However, parties differ in the extent to which they seek to 
establish cross-border linkages with non-resident voters. In this paper we have suggested 
that transnational party outreach needs to be understood both in the context of general 
understandings of the effect of electoral institutions, political competition and party 
characteristics as well as insights on emigrant political behaviour and emigrant voting 
rights drawn from the literature on transnational migration.  
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Overall, our analysis suggests that the basic logic of parties going transnational 
when the benefits outweigh the cost goes a long way towards explaining how parties 
navigate the transnational electoral field of emigrant voters, even though this field is 
characterised by complicated logistics as well as uncertainty, volatility and low turnout of 
the emigrant electorate. Consequently, the parties that are more present abroad in terms of 
their political programme and transnational infrastructure are the two main parties of each 
of the national party systems at the time of study. The main centre-right and left parties 
perceive a competitive advantage, as emigrant voters tend to converge on stronger parties 
as the most credible options to have political influence in the homeland. Recent studies 
have argued that the broader appeal as well as the mass organisations of these parties 
facilitate their linkage with partisan and independent voters (Dalton et al. 2011; 
Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2012). Similarly, the organisational resources of most of 
the larger main-stream parties in our analysis, such as developed and refined party 
structures and linkages with interest groups, seem particularly relevant for facilitating 
communication and linkage with the broad range of voters in different settings abroad.  
 In the category of parties who do not pursue the emigrant vote neither in terms of 
transnational presence or policy proposals we find a series of smaller and/or regional 
parties with limited campaign resources and low expectation of emigrant voter support. In 
the context of transnational campaigning, resources are, however, not just a matter of the 
size of the party organisation and its financial backup. The EELV or M5S are examples 
of how relatively smaller parties with a stronger linkage with transnational social 
movements can draw on these networks when establishing their transnational 
infrastructure of party branches. 
Yet, there are also features of the transnational electoral scene which tempers the 
cost-benefit analysis based on electoral institutions, political competition and party 
resources. Political parties mention the past close results in legislative elections in Italy, 
presidential elections in Romania and regional elections in Spain as a driver to intensify 
or keep up their campaigns. Still, the uncertainly, volatility and low turnout of the emigrant 
vote renders it more difficult for parties to fine-tune their campaign strategy abroad. More 
detailed studies could compare the extent to which parties concentrate more on countries 
with higher numbers of emigrants or in districts with a particularly close result. In our 
broader analysis, a pattern appears where, given the uncertainty of emigrant voting 
preferences and turnout, parties seek to avoid being relatively invisible in terms of local 
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contact with and policy messages to emigrant voters. A catch-up or visibility logic 
characterises the transnational behaviour of the larger and more resourceful political 
parties. The restrictions of emigrant voting rights in Spain before the 2011 elections do 
not appear to have influenced the transnational reach-out effort of parties indicating that 
once parties have their transnational campaign message and infra structure set up it is less 
costly to keep it running.  
Moreover, the particular context of emigration matters for party transnational 
outreach. In the countries with a longer trajectory of emigration and external voting rights 
political parties have a stronger tendency to include emigrant concerns in their political 
programmes. In contrast, Romanian parties are still in the process of understanding 
emigrants as a permanent presence abroad. Their transnational party strategies are 
characterised by a rapidly expanding transnational presence but more limited attempts to 
concretely addressing emigrant concerns in party programmes.  
 The dynamic of overlapping electoral arenas in cases where emigrants vote 
in different types of homeland elections is noticeable in Romania and Spain. The close 
results in the Romanian presidential elections or Spanish regional elections encourage 
parties to compete for the emigrant vote in these type of elections with a spillover effect 
to campaigning abroad also in national legislative elections. Further studies could explore 
the dynamics of party outreach also in European or, in particular, local elections where 
dual or European citizens have voting rights both in their country of origin and residence 
hence providing more incentive for transnational collaboration among parties in both 
countries.  
The notion of overlapping electoral arenas between homeland and emigrant 
electoral settings is, in this analysis, mainly relevant to cases of high rates of emigration 
to particular destination countries such as the case of the Canarian Coalition party. 
Otherwise, party awareness of a spillover effect from reaching out to emigrant voters were 
not among the salient motives expressed by parties in our cases. Broader comparative 
studies, including also cases beyond the EU and cases with stronger differences in 
emigrant transnational influence through economic and social remittances would allow us 
to better understand the logic of overlapping electoral arenas and spillover mechanisms. 
To that end, this paper suggests that the relevance of overlapping electoral arenas is not 
just a feature of particular situations of strong transnational ties between emigrants and 
their homeland, but can also be mediated by the type of electoral system institution in 
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place. In particular, it is worth exploring further if this logic of spillover is more likely in 
cases where emigrant votes are counted in the same district (legislative elections without 
special representation and presidential elections) than in cases of special representation 
where parties compete for a particular number of seats among emigrant voters only.  
Finally, general party endorsement of emigrant voting rights also plays into the 
motivation of especially smaller parties to pursue the emigrant vote although this does not 
follow any particular left-right logic. In some cases there is a strong fit between the overall 
party ideology and the perceived socio-economic profile of the emigrant voters as in the 
case of the Spanish United Left. Meanwhile, in other cases, the transnational campaign is 
tempered by a general position on the emigrant vote as less important than the voting rights 
of immigrants. A recent study has shown a negative relationship between party support 
for the granting of external voting rights and support for multiculturalism (Østergaard-
Nielsen et al. 2015). Further studies could investigate the extent to which party position 
on immigration influences the degree of transnational outreach of parties and the extent to 
which both endorsement and outreach are related back to expected or experienced 
electoral return among emigrant voters.  
The increased mobility of voters combined with the expansion of cross border 
voting rights challenges parties to reconfigure their strategies of mobilisation. In this paper 
we have suggested a conceptual framework drawing on both insights from party behaviour 
in a domestic setting and the characteristics of emigrant voting rights and transnational 
electoral field. Such framework help explain both the dynamic of competition among the 
bigger parties as well as the transnational outreach of smaller parties with no expectation 
of any substantial electoral return. Further more in-depth studies can reveal the broader 
set of outreach activities in particular contexts, while broader studies can explore to what 
extent the findings from this paper are relevant for a different or broader set of cases. The 
case studies presented here demonstrate the extent to which political parties are capable 
of not just adapting to but also structuring the content and infrastructure of transnational 
democratic processes in the wake of the enfranchisement of emigrant voters.   
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Appendix 1: List and key characteristics of main parties included 
 Country Party name Abbreviation Election Ideological 
linkage 
Number of 
emigrant 
related 
proposals/ 
themes 
Transnational 
infrastructure 
Emigrant 
electoral 
support last 
election in 
% 
Closeness 
last election 
in % 
Number of 
candidates 
presented in 
external districts 
Spain Popular Party/Partido Popular PP 2011 1,25 7 44 28,05 29,42 n.a 
Spanish Socialist Workers 
Party/Partido  Socialista Obrero 
Español 
PSOE 2011 1,13 14 37 57,47 29,42 n.a 
United Left/Izquierda Unida IU 2011 2,99 31 6 1,79 29,42 n.a 
Canarian Coalition /Coalicion 
Canarias 
CC 2011 0,66 3 2 2,74 29,42 n.a 
Galician Nationalist Bloc/Bloque 
Nacionalista Gallego 
BNG 2011 0,00 0 
 
5 0,82 29,42 n.a 
Convergence and 
Union/Convergencia i Unio 
CiU 2011 0,00 0 2 1,32 29,42 n.a 
Union, Progress and 
Democracy/Unión Progreso y 
Democracia 
UpyD 2011 0,00 0 2 0,66 29,42 n.a 
Republican Left of 
Catalunya/Esquerra Republicana 
de Catalunya 
ERC 2011 0,03 1 0 0,51 29,42 n.a 
France Union for a Popular Movement 
/Union pour un mouvement 
populaire 
UMP 2012 13,63 25 100 38,49 8,57 NA: 11/11 
Socialist Party/ Parti Socialiste PS 2012 19,88 28 60 29,92 8.57 NA: 10/11 
Europe Ecology – The 
Greens/Europe-Écologie Les 
Verts 
EELV  2012 0,65 13 11 1,98 8.57 NA:9/11 
Left Front/Front de Gauche FdG 2012 0,00  0 0 0,56 (PCF)  8.57 NA:11/11 
National Front/Front National FN 2012 0,00  0 23 3,27 8.57 NA:11/11 
 29 
Democratic Movement/Le Centre 
pour la France (Mouvement 
démocrate) 
MoDem 2012 0,00  0 11 21,54 
(UDF) 
8.57 NA: 8/11 
Radical Party/Parti Radical PRV 2012 0,00  0 5 n.a. 8.57 NA:6/11 
New Centre/Nouveau Centre  NC 2012 0,00  0 0 21,54 
(UDF) 
8.57 NA:4/11 
The Radical Left/Parti Radical de 
Gauche  
PRG 2012 0,35 0 0 n.a 8.57 NA: 11/11 
Italy Democratic Party/Partito 
Democratico  
PD 2013 13,21 5 114 32,48 1.58 CoD 24/24, Sen: 
12/12 
The People of Freedom/Popolo 
della Libertà 
PdL 2013 16,53 11 10 30,9 1.58 CoD 24/24 Sen: 
12/12 
Civic Choice/ Scelta Civica – Con 
Monti per Italia,  
SC 2013 1,14 1 4 n.a 1.58 CoD: 15/24, Sen 
7/12  - in coalition 
with  Maie in 
American district. 
5 Star Movement/Movimento 5 
Stelle 
M5S 2013 0,00  0 21 n.a 1.58 CoD 19/24, Sen: 
12/12 
Associative Movement of Italians 
abroad/Movimento Associativo 
Italiani all'Estero 
Maie 2013 100,00 14 46 8,33 1.58 CoD: 8/24, Sen: 
4/12 –in coalition 
with Civic Choice 
in American 
district. 
Left Ecology Freedom /Sinistra 
Ecologia Libertà 
SEL 2013 0,19  0 5 2,83 (The 
Left) 
1.58 CoD: 10/24, Sen: 
0/12, joint ticket 
with PD in non-
European districts 
Romania Alliance Just Romania/Alianta 
Romania Dreapta+ 
ARD 2012 1,82 9 31 45,6 24,8 CoD: 4/4, Sen: 2/2 
Social Democrat and Liberal 
Union/Uniunea Social Liberala 
USL 2012 0,74  0 54 35,7  24,8 CoD: 4/4, Sen: 2/2 
The People Party/Partidul 
Poporului 
PPDD 2012 2,99 3 53 n.a 24,8 CoD: 4/4, Sen: 2/2 
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Hungarian Democratic 
Union/Uniunea Democrata a 
Maghiarilor din Romania 
UDMR 2012 0,93  0 0 2 24,8 
 
CoD: 4/4, Sen: 2/2 
Notes: Ideological linkage: percentage of emigration related words over total number of words in the electoral programme.  Transnational infrastructure: number of external 
branches.  
Year of last election: France 2007 presidential elections, 1st round; Italy 2008 legislative elections for CdD; Spain 2008 legislative elections; Romania 2008 legislative 
elections; NA: National Assembly; CoD: Chamber of Deputies; Sen: Senate; Closeness of the result: the difference between results among all emigrant voters of the two most 
voted parties. Some smaller parties taking less than 3% of the vote in Italy, France and Spain have not been included. 
Coalitions: USL is a temporary alliance of the National Liberal Party (PNL), the Social Democrat Party (PSD) and the Conservative Party (PC). ARD is a temporary alliance 
of the Democrat Liberal Party (PDL), Christian Democratic Peasants’ Party (PNTCD) and Civic Force (FC). The ideological linkage, transnational infrastructure scores and 
electoral support are the sum of the corresponding number for each party. For the other coalitions of Civil Choice/Maie and PD/SEL in the case of Italy the numbers are 
reported per party as there were only coalitions in some districts. In the case of France, some branches appear to overlap with party presence in the Outre Mer districts which 
also have special representation.  
Sources transnational infrastructure: Own elaboration from interviews and party websites accessed in the period 2011-2013.  In the case of the UMP, the information was 
only collected/verified during 2014/5 and the number for the 2012 campaign could be slightly lower. In the case of the CiU the number is an estimate based on interview with 
a coalition party. The number for the Upyd is taken from an interview in an emigrant online journal in 2009.  
Sources ideological linkage: Electoral programmes downloaded from party websites and general repositories like the Comparative Manifesto Project. In a few cases the 
parties post particular programmes for emigrants but otherwise the word count is generally taken from within the general programme. Other sources: Electoral statistics from:  
https://www.interieur.gouv.fr/Elections/Les-resultats; http://elezionistorico.interno.it/; http://www.roaep.ro/istoric/; http://www.infoelectoral.mir.es/infoelectoral/min/ 
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1 Globalcit database on electoral rights, http://globalcit.eu/, last accessed 15/1 2018. 
2 Conseil Economique, Social et Environnemental 2009. Les français établis hors de France : leurs attentes, 
leurs besoins. Journal officiel de la république française. Avis et rapports du conseil économique, social et 
environnemental, nr. 2, see http://www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/rapports-
publics/094000062/index.shtml, last accessed 20/08/2018 
3  Electoral results for Italy, see http://elezionistorico.interno.it. Electoral results for Romania, see 
http://alegeri.roaep.ro. 
4 Heraldo, 14.03.2008, ‘El voto emigrante amplía la ventaja del PSOE en un millón de votos.’  
5 El Dia, 07.03.2009, “El PSE consigue su escaño 25 con el voto de los residentes en el extranjero”; El Pais, 
17.03.2008, “Melchior, el senador emigrante” 
6 Asturias Exterior, 30.03.2012, “El voto emigrante decide en Asturias”, El Mundo, 26.06.2005 “El decisivo 
voto de los emigrantes”. 
7 In the 2012 elections, the PDL was part of the Alliance Just Romania (ARD) and the Social Democrat 
Party (PSD) was part of the Social Liberal Union (USL). 
                                                 
